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1 INTRODUCTION
In this paper we assess the impact of European Union (EU) Cohesion Policy on regional
productivity growth in the period 1991-2008. In particular, we propose a spatial growth
model that allows for the identification of two types of effects of EU funds: a direct effect
on growth of the recipient region, and an indirect effect stemming from spatial spillovers
from neighbouring regions.
The EU allocates a relevant part of its budget (about EUR 213 billion at 1999 prices
over the period 2000-2006) to promote social and economic cohesion among the regions of
the member states. The overall goals of EU policy are to promote the competitiveness of
European regions (Articles 130(f)-130(p), Single European Act, 1987) and, at the same
time, to reduce: “disparities between the levels of development of various regions, and the
backwardness of the less-favoured regions” (Article 130(a), Single European Act, 1987).
In 2017, given the recent enlargement of EU to 28 countries, and in the light of the debate
on how: “fiscal policies should support the economic recovery through public investment”
(Draghi, 2016), EU policy is all the more important in the EU agenda.
Previous research tried to answer several questions on EU Cohesion Policy, from the
most general on its effectiveness in increasing EU regional growth and reducing dispari-
ties (see in particular the pioneering contribution of Boldrin and Canova, 2001), to more
specific questions on the effect of different types of funds (such as those targeted to the
poorest regions, see, e.g., Dall’Erba and Le Gallo, 2008). Subsequently, more specific
issues have been addressed. For example, Dall’Erba et al. (2009) analyse the opportunity
to geographically concentrate funding in order to exploit possible spatial externalities,
while Becker et al. (2012) suggest to allocate funds more equally among regions if funds
have decreasing marginal effects. Farole et al. (2011) discuss the potential trade-off be-
tween growth and the reduction of regional disparities in the allocation of funds, while
Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Novak (2013) focus on the effective benefits of the changes in the im-
plementation and management of EU Cohesion Policy over different programming periods.
Finally, Becker et al. (2013) identify the regional characteristics enhancing the effective-
ness of funds (see Barca, 2009 and Pien´kowski and Berkowitz, 2015 for exhaustive reviews
of the literature).
The major focus of this paper, i.e. the effectiveness of EU funds, however, still rep-
resents a matter of controversy (Maynou et al., 2016). Funds’ effectiveness is mostly,
but not exclusively, evaluated by econometric analyses of growth and convergence across
European regions, and several studies found positive growth effects of EU Cohesion pol-
icy (see, e.g., De la Fuente and Vives, 1995, Cappelen et al., 2003, Rodr´ıguez-Pose and
Fratesi, 2004, Beugelsdijk and Eijffinger, 2005, Ederveen et al., 2006, and Checherita et al.,
2009). In particular, several econometric estimates find a positive effect of funds targeted
to “Objective 1” regions, i.e. regions having a per capita GDP lower than 75% of EU
average (see, e.g., Ramajo et al., 2008, Mohl and Hagen, 2010, Becker and von Ehrlich,
2010; Becker et al., 2012, 2013, Pellegrini et al., 2013, and De Dominicis, 2014). More
specifically, Gagliardi and Percoco (2017) find that the highest effect on growth is experi-
enced by rural Objective 1 regions that are closer to urban centres; Ferrara et al. (2016)
find that Objective 1 funds had positive effects on infrastructure development (proxied
by road accessibility), and, especially, on innovation activities (proxied by patents appli-
cations); Giua (2017) finds that Regional Policy had a positive impact on Italian regional
employment; and, finally, Di Cataldo (2017) highlights the negative impact of Brexit
(with the subsequent loss of EU funding) on UK regions. Other works, on the contrary,
find non-significant or even negative effects (Boldrin and Canova, 2001, Dall’Erba and
Le Gallo, 2008, and Dall’Erba et al., 2009).
Other approaches to study the effectiveness of funds include Brandsma et al. (2015),
who propose to calibrate a dynamic spatial equilibrium to study the impact of Cohesion
Policy; Fortuna et al. (2016) who, adopting a Computational General Equilibrium ap-
proach, find by simulations that the elimination of EU funds in the Portuguese region of
Azores would have caused a significant drop in its levels of GDP and consumption; and,
finally, Medeiros (2017) who, adopting the Territorial Impact Analysis approach, finds
the highest impact of the funds in Spain in the “socio-economic cohesion” dimension, and
the lowest in the “morphologic polycentricity” dimension.
These studies, however, differ in the type of funds analysed, sample size, program-
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ming periods and methodology (see Pien´kowski and Berkowitz, 2015). In addition, much
work on the effect of EU funding neglects spatial effects among EU regions (see, e.g.,
De la Fuente and Vives, 1995, Cappelen et al., 2003, Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Fratesi, 2004,
Beugelsdijk and Eijffinger, 2005, Ederveen et al., 2006, Checherita et al., 2009, Becker
et al., 2012, 2013, and Pellegrini et al., 2013), even though several works found significant
evidence of their presence (see, e.g., Dall’Erba and Le Gallo, 2008, Dall’Erba et al., 2009,
Mohl and Hagen, 2010, Le Gallo et al., 2011, and De Dominicis, 2014). Tests for spatial
externalities of funds (Le Gallo et al., 2011) and their possible nonlinear effects (Becker
et al., 2012) and are even rarer in the literature.
In this paper we propose to evaluate the impact of funds by a spatial Solovian growth
model. Funds affect regional production both in an unmediated way, as public expenditure
in Barro (1990), and in a mediated way, by generating spatial total factor productivity
(TFP) externalities, in the spirit of Bottazzi and Peri (2003) and Ertur and Koch (2007).
The theoretical model allows for the derivation of an econometric model belonging to the
class of Spatial Durbin Models (see Anselin, 1988).
We then estimate the econometric model on a sample of 175 regions from EU12 for
three programming periods (1989-1993, 1994-1999 and 2000-2006), controlling for endo-
geneity of funds, time effects, and unobserved regional characteristics. Our results suggest
that the effect of funds is characterized by strong spatial externalities, and that not all
types of funds stimulate regional growth. In particular, the effect on the growth of GDP
per worker of “Objective 1” funds is positive and concave, reaching a peak at the ra-
tio funds/GDP of approximately 3% and becoming non-significant after 4%. “Objective
2” and “Cohesion” funds have non-significant effects, while all the other funds exert a
positive and significant effect, but their impact is very small given their limited size. In
addition, we find that EU Cohesion Policy appears to increase its effectiveness over time.
Focusing on the most recent programming period considered in the analysis (2000-2006),
we estimate a median multiplier equal to 1.52 for Objective 1 funds, which added 0.38%
to the median regional annual growth of GDP per worker. Overall, EU Cohesion Policy
in the period 1991-2008 is estimated to have added 1.4% to the median annual growth,
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and to have reduced regional disparities by 8 basis points in terms of the Gini index.
We contribute to the existing literature in several respects. First, the proposed theo-
retical spatial growth model allows for a transparent derivation of the different channels
(i.e. direct and indirect) through which funds affect regional growth, and provides a guide
for their identification in the empirical analysis, i.e. it helps to assess: “how long-lasting
these effects [of funds] are [...] and ... the precise mechanisms underlying the effects
on growth” (Neumark and Simpson, 2015, p. 1275). Differently, most of the literature
on Cohesion Policy, including the contributions considering spatial externalities, takes a
data-driven approach in which covariates are inserted in the econometric analyses with-
out reference to a fully-specified model, introducing risks of misspecification and omitted
variable problems (Pien´kowski and Berkowitz, 2015).
Second, in line with our theoretical model, we depart from the most of literature and
study the effects of funding on growth of regional GDP per worker, instead of GDP per
capita. We argue that GDP per worker is the correct measure to evaluate the capacity
of EU Cohesion Policy to enhance regional competitiveness (Annoni and Kozovska, 2010)
and favour backward regions.
Third, we build an harmonized dataset on EU Cohesion Policy for the period 1989-
2006 disaggregated by different types of funds at NUTS 2 level, plugging a gap in the
literature discussed, e.g., in Pien´kowski and Berkowitz (2015). This allows to exploit
panel data techniques to control for regional unobservable characteristics. In particular,
the econometric model includes both regional and time fixed effects, and spatially lagged
variables, and is estimated by fixed-effect spatial panel techniques, filling a lacuna in the
literature highlighted by Mohl and Hagen (2010).
Fourth, we discuss both theoretically and empirically the crucial role of spatial exter-
nalities of funds in the analysis of the effects of EU Cohesion Policy, whose importance in
the evaluation of place-based policies is discussed by Neumark and Simpson (2015). How-
ever, so far, but with other methodologies, only Becker and von Ehrlich (2010), Le Gallo
et al. (2011) and Gagliardi and Percoco (2017) have analysed this phenomenon. In par-
ticular, Becker and von Ehrlich (2010) use a regression discontinuity design to identify
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the effect on an Objective-1 region of the funds received by other Objective-1 regions
within some distance (150 or 200 km). Le Gallo et al. (2011) use the SALE model sug-
gested by Pace and LeSage (2004) to estimate a specific effect of funds on each region.
However, they consider a smaller sample and a shorter time period (145 regions in the
period 1989-1999), and do not disaggregate funds by objectives. Finally, Gagliardi and
Percoco (2017) highlight that the impact of Objective-1 funds displays a spatial pattern
determined by the territorial characteristics of regions (i.e. their degree of urbanization
and distance from main urban agglomerates).
Fifth, we contribute to the debate on the possibility for EU Cohesion Policy to “max-
imize overall growth while also achieving continuous convergence in outcomes and pro-
ductivity across Europes regions” (Farole et al., 2011). Specifically, our analysis suggests
that Cohesion Policy in 1989-2006 was effective for both enhancing growth and reducing
regional disparities.
Finally, we introduce a new methodology to select the best specification of a spatial
weights matrix based on the value of AICc (see Anderson, 2007), which represents an
alternative to the Bayesian approach proposed by LeSage and Pace (2009). We find that
the best spatial weights matrix is based on a combination of geographical and technological
proximity (proxied by the geographical distances among regions and the (di)similarity
of the regional output compositions respectively). This finding supports the idea that
regional spatial externalities should also include knowledge spillovers (Boschma, 2005 and
Aghion and Jaravel, 2015), an aspect generally neglected in the literature on regional
growth (an exception is Basile et al., 2012).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the main features of EU
Cohesion Policy; Section 3 describes our dataset; Section 4 proposes a spatial growth
model with EU funds; Section 5 derives the econometric model and presents the results
of the empirical analysis; Section 6 contains concluding remarks and discusses the policy
implications of our findings.
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2 THE EU COHESION POLICY
EU Cohesion Policy aims at promoting regions’ competitiveness and at reducing the eco-
nomic and social disparities among the regions of the member states. The allocation of
most of funds is based on the definition of a number of “objectives” (originally from 1 to 6),
among which the most important is the relative backwardness of a region, and of “Commu-
nity Initiatives Programmes”. In particular, in the period 1994-2006 a large portion of the
funds went to “Objective 1” regions, i.e. regions with a per capita GDP lower than 75%
of EU average. Moreover, since the programming period 1994-1999 the Cohesion Fund is
allocated to less-developed states, i.e. states with a per capita GDP below 90% of EU aver-
age, to support environmental and transport infrastructure projects. In the programming
period 2000-2006 the number of objectives and initiatives was reduced to “Objective 1”,
“Objective 2”, and to Community Initiatives: INTERREG III (interregional cooperation)
and URBAN II (sustainable development of urban areas) (see Molle, 2007 and Pellegrini
et al., 2013 for more details). Neumark and Simpson (2015) discuss EU Cohesion Policy
as a place-based policy, which can be: “rationalized by various hypotheses in urban and
labor economics, such as agglomeration economies and spatial mismatch.” Since 2006 the
classification of regions into Objectives has been discontinued, and current terminology
refers to “least developed” regions for those originally defined “Objective 1” regions (see
https://europa.eu/european-union/topics/regional-policy_en), while the former
“Objective 2” regions are not precisely identified. However, in the rest of paper we main-
tain the old terminology to facilitate the comparison with the literature.
In particular, three features of EU Cohesion Policy appear particularly important for
our analysis. First, from our reading of the allocation criteria, not all types of funds
are unambiguously direct to stimulate regional GDP per worker, in particular in back-
ward regions, in contrast with the stated goals of favouring competitiveness and reducing
disparities among European regions. Boldrin and Canova (2001, p. 211) argue that the
overall EU policy appears: “to serve a redistributional purpose”, and not to favour growth
and convergence. In particular, only Objective 1 funds and Cohesion Funds are explicitly
targeted to the poorest regions to favour their catching-up. On the contrary, Objective 2
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funds, aiming at supporting declining industries, and Objective 5 funds, supporting the
agricultural and fishing sectors, may actually slow down GDP per worker growth. In
fact, these types of funding are likely to interfere with the process of structural change,
in which the resources from mature sectors, i.e. the agricultural and fishing sectors, are
gradually reallocated to more innovative and productive sectors (Dall’Erba et al., 2009,
p. 93, make a similar remark). These funds therefore should be considered more income
support than stimuli to GDP per worker growth. The same remark applies to the Co-
hesion Funds: on the one hand the development of, e.g., waste disposal plants does not
seem directly linked to productivity growth; on the other, the development of interregional
(and international) transport networks may have a positive or negative effect on regional
productivity depending on the direction that the subsequent agglomeration of economic
activity follows (see Ottaviano and Thisse, 2004 and Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Fratesi, 2004).
Therefore, the sign of the impact of some type of funds on the growth rate of GDP per
worker is a priori ambiguous.
A second remark regards the considerable effort of the European Commission to refine
and improve the EU Cohesion Policy over different programming periods (see Rodr´ıguez-
Pose and Novak, 2013). The major changes happened between the second and third
programming periods included in our analysis. In particular, the concentration in fewer
objectives in the third programming period was associated to higher geographical concen-
tration in the funds’ allocation and to greater targeting of resources to the poorest regions
(see Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Novak, 2013 and Section 3 below). Moreover, in the third pro-
gramming period there was a shift in the types of investments from infrastructures to
the promotion of competitiveness, job creation, education and training (see Molle, 2007).
Finally, European Commission (2001b) discusses the important institutional changes of
the third programming period, among which the involvement in the elaboration of the
policy of several institutional actors, in addition to Commission and Member States gov-
ernments, and the greater attention to monitoring and evaluating of the actual results
of interventions. In this regard, Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Novak (2013) find evidence of a
“learning process” in the implementation of EU Cohesion Policy.
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A final remark regards the key presence of spatial externalities in the implementation
of the EU Cohesion Policy (see Neumark and Simpson, 2015, p. 1225). In fact, spatial
externalities are likely to characterize investments in infrastructures, largely decided and
implemented by transnational cooperation partnerships, but also to affect other types
of investments, largely funded in the most recent programming periods, such as those
aiming at supporting the accumulation of “knowledge” (e.g. investment in education
and workforce’s training). By their nature, this type of investments can generate sig-
nificant knowledge spillovers (see Breschi and Lissoni, 2001 for a critical review of this
phenomenon). For example, financing of road infrastructures affects production in the
region where the road infrastructures are built, but also has an impact on the same region
caused by the road infrastructures built in its neighbouring regions (see Neumark and
Simpson, 2015, p. 1268). Alternatively, a rise in productivity in a region due to, e.g., new
technologies generated by R&D investments, or improvements in workers’ skills caused by
a training program, may diffuse to its neighbours. Hence the presence of spatial externali-
ties implies that EU funds should be expected to have two types of effect on regional GDP
per worker: an unmediated effect, i.e. a primary effect on GDP per worker growth due to
the funds allocated to the region (i.e. funds work as an input for local production), and
a mediated effect of the EU funds allocated to other regions, caused by the presence of
spatial externalities. More importantly, we should observe a multiplicative effect of funds
on GDP per worker of regions, whose identification will require a specific procedure (see
Section 4 for further details) We will take into account these remarks in the elaboration
of the theoretical model in Section 4 and in the empirical analysis of Section 5.
3 THE STRUCTURAL AND COHESION FUNDS
DATASET
We use data on Structural and Cohesion Funds covering three programming periods:
1989-1993 (Period I), 1994-1999 (Period II), and 2000-2006 (Period III) for 175 regions of
twelve EU countries, with the exclusion of regions belonging to the former East Germany,
9
one Dutch region (Flevoland), and two Spanish regions (Ceuta and Melilla and Canarias).1
All funds are expressed in 2000 constant prices.
We discard the period 1975-1988 because the allocation was not driven by specific
Objectives while, as discussed in Section 2, a correct analysis on the effectiveness of
Cohesion Policy requires to separately consider the different types of funds. This also
led us to consider payments for the period 2000-2006 and commitments for the periods
1989-1993 and 1994-1999 as a proxy for the actual use of funds in a region.2 Payments
clearly represent a more precise measurement of the use of funds, but focusing on this
measure would imply to limit the analysis only to Period III (2000-2006), losing the crucial
advantages of panel data analysis (i.e. the possibility to control for regional unobservable
heterogeneity and to analyse how the effectiveness of Cohesion Policy changed over time).
As general remark, the use of commitments in periods I and II could induce a downward
bias in the estimated effect of funds, and a measurement error problem (see Hagen and
Mohl, 2008). In Section 5.2 we will deal with both issues.
We consider European regions at NUTS 2 level but, since only 57% of total funds
in Periods I and II are directly allocated to individual regions, we adopted the follow-
ing criteria to approximate the actual amount of funds received by a region (see also
Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Fratesi, 2004, p. 111 and Mohl and Hagen, 2010, p. 356):
• if the fund is jointly allocated to a group of regions, we reassign it to individual
NUTS 2 regions in an amount inversely proportional to their per capita GDP in the
initial year of the programming period (4% of total funds in our dataset);
• if the fund is allocated to a country, but it is possible to identify the eligible regions
(e. g. Objective 1), then it is reassigned to all the eligible regions (e. g. Objective 1
1The exclusion of the regions of former Easter Germany and Flevoland is due to missing data in the
instrumental variables used to control for the endogeneity of funds, while Ceuta and Melilla and Canarias
has no neighbours for many of spatial weights matrix used in the analysis (see Section 5 for more details).
Data are collected from different publications of the European Commission: European Commission (1995)
and European Commission (1997) (Period I); European Commission (1997) and European Commission
(2000) (Period II); SWECO International (2008) (Period III). See Appendix C for the list of regions.
2For the period 1994-1999, the joint availability of data on commitments and payments at NUTS
2 level (but without any disaggregation by types of funds) allows to calculate that, on average, about
75% of commitments were effectively used, and that heterogeneity in the use of funds across regions was
relatively low. For the period 1989-1993, data are available only at country level, with an average use of
about 80% (Parenti, 2009).
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regions) in an amount inversely proportional to their per capita GDP in the initial
year of the programming period (26% of total funds);
• if the fund is allocated at country level, but it is not possible to identify the eligible
regions (e. g. the Cohesion Funds), then we reassign it to all the NUTS 2 regions
of the country in an amount inversely proportional to their per capita GDP in the
initial year of the programming periods (13% of total funds).
We chose to reassign the funds proportionally to per capita GDP since this is the
main criterion used for the allocation of most of the funds (e.g. Objective 1 and Cohesion
Funds). The results presented below remain significantly unaffected if we reassign funds
to individual regions with respect their GDP per worker (results available upon request).
3.1 Descriptive statistics
The measure of the funds used in the analysis will be the ratio between the annual mean
amount of funds given to a region in a programming period and the GDP level of the
region in the first year of programming period. Data on regional GDP are from Cambridge
Econometrics (2010) (codes and data are available at the authors’ websites). The use of
the first year for GDP aims at avoiding the reverse causation effect from GDP growth to
funds’ intensity. This variable will be denoted SCF, and will proxy for the intensity of
funding on the production side of the economy.3
Table 1 shows the evolution of SCF in the three programming periods and the share
of the funds allocated to the regions in our sample with respect to the total amount of
funding. The overall intensity of funding with respect to total EU GDP (i.e. of the GDP
of the 12 countries considered in the analysis), is almost equal in Periods I and III, and
reaches a peak of 0.33% in Period II. There are some fluctuations in the average and
median regional level of SCF and in its standard deviation, but these differences did not
result statistically significant from a bootstrap test (results available upon request).
3With “intensity of funding” we are using the jargon of controlled experiments as in Becker et al.
(2012), to be interpreted as the (annual) intensity of the treatment received by regions through the
Cohesion Policy.
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Programming % SCF % OB1 funds Share of total funds Average Median St. Dev.
Period to our sample to our sample on 12-EU GDP SCF SCF of SCF
Period I 88.93 92.10 0.0021 0.0057 0.0019 0.0091
Period II 75.98 69.70 0.0033 0.0057 0.0016 0.0088
Period III 73.52 72.69 0.0021 0.0057 0.0016 0.0109
Table 1: Descriptive statistics on Structural and Cohesion Funds in the three programming periods
Period I (1989-1992), Period II (1994-1999), and Period III (2000-2006) for the sample of 175 regions of
Appendix C.
Table 2 reports the shares of the different types of funds across the programming
periods. It shows that Objective 1 attracted the largest share of funds in all periods with
an average share of approximately 65%, followed by Cohesion and Objective 2 funds,
whose shares peaked in Period III to 16.7% and 16.8% of total funds, respectively.4
Objective Period I (1989-1993) Period II (1994-1999) Period III (2000-2006)
1 67.3 59.7 63.7
2 9.2 6.2 16.7
3 - 8.0 -
4 - 1.3 -
3 & 4 10.4 - -
5a (Agriculture) 5.4 3.2 -
5a (Fishery) 0.9 0.4 -
5b 3.8 4.2 -
PIM 0.4 - -
2 Initiative - 3.3 0.5
Other Initiatives - 1.9 2.4
Cohesion 2.6 11.8 16.8
Total 100 100 100
Table 2: Percentage of commitments of funds according to Objectives for the sample of 175 regions of
Appendix C. “PIM”: regional program in Period I for regions outside Objective 1; “2 Initiative”: regional
initiatives similar to Objective 2 for period III (Adapt, Employment, Rechard, Resider, Retex, Konver,
SMEs), “Other Initiatives”: other initiatives in Period II (Leader, Regis, Urban, Pesca, Peace)
Table 3, finally, presents the distribution of the funds among the less productive regions
in our sample (i.e. with GDP per worker below 75%).5 The first row, indicating the overall
share of funds received by this group of regions, shows that their share is increasing over
time but it is never higher than 50%. The less productive regions, however, receive a
high and increasing share of Objective 1 funds, in line with the principle of allocating
these funds to the poorest regions. Yet this share, on average, never reaches 60% of total
funds. As noted by Becker and von Ehrlich (2010) with respect to Objective 1 funds, some
4Although the Cohesion Fund was created with the 1993 reform, it began to operate in 1993 under a
temporary regulation. Thus, a part of the total funds was allocated as Cohesion Fund also in Period I.
5This threshold is chosen to mimic the threshold identifying Objective 1 regions. The correlation
between per capita GDP and per worker GDP in our sample is very high (0.79, 0.84 and 0.85 in Periods
I, II, and III respectively).
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“poor” regions might not receive funding, while some “rich” regions might receive them,
because of some of the rules governing the allocation of funds across different programming
periods, such as the ones on the so-called “phasing-out” support, provided to Objective
1 regions after they passed the 75% threshold. The main insight from Table 3 is that,
notwithstanding the aim of favouring catching-up and competitiveness gains of the most
disadvantaged regions, a sizeable amount of EU funding is not actually directed to them.
Period I (1989-1993) Period II (1994-1999) Period III (2000-2006)
All Objectives 37.5 44.7 47.5
Objective 1 52.3 58.0 58.1
Objective 2 0.0 0.0 1.6
Objective 3 & 4 & 5 3.5 1.6 -
Objective 6 & Other Initiatives 0.0 26.2 45.4
Cohesion 60.9 83.4 61.4
Table 3: Percentage of total funds and of different types of funds given to regions with GDP per worker
below 75% of sample mean for the sample of 175 regions of Appendix C.
To sum up, with respect to our sample, the most salient features of EU Cohesion Policy
are: i) the resources devoted by the European Union to the Cohesion Policy as ratio to EU
GDP have increased from Period I (1989-1993) to Period II (1994-1999), to come back to
the same level in Period III (2000-2006); ii) by far, most of the funds are devoted to reach
Objective 1; iii) the share of Cohesion Funds has remarkably increased over time, reaching
a considerable size in Period II; iv) Objective 2 funding is also substantial, relative to the
other Objectives different from 1 and Cohesion funds; v) a non-negligible share of EU
funding is allocated to “not-so-poor” regions.
4 A Spatial Growth Model with Structural and Co-
hesion Funds
In this section we present a modified Solovian growth model which encompasses both
the mediated and unmediated impacts of EU funds and allows to evaluate their relative
importance. As regards the unmediated impact, we follow the insights of the Barro
(1990)’s model, in which public expenditure appears as an input in production, providing
a flow of services that affects the marginal product of private factors of production. In
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particular, assume that the GDP of region i at time t is given by:
Yit = G (fi)K
α
it (AitLit)
1−α , (1)
with α ∈ (0, 1), where fi, Kit, Lit, and Ait respectively denote the ratio of EU funds
received by region i to regional GDP (assumed to be constant over time t), the capital
stock, the employment level, and the total factor productivity (TFP) of region i at time
t. For the sake of simplicity we ignore the role of human capital in production (but we
will nonetheless control for its effects in the empirical analysis).
The shape of G (fi) determines the unmediated effect of EU funds on Yit, which can
be either to enhance the returns of private factors (like in Barro, 1990), or to decrease the
overall efficiency of an economy by affecting the efficient reallocation of resources across
sectors (as discussed in Section 2).6 To maintain maximum flexibility we only assume
that G (0) = 1 (i.e. funds are not essential for production), and G (fi) > 0 if fi > 0
(production is always positive).
As regards the mediated impact of EU funds, we assume that spatial externalities of
EU Cohesion Policy operate through Ait. In particular, following Bottazzi and Peri (2003)
and Ertur and Koch (2007), assume that Ait can be expressed as:
Ait = ψ (fi) Ωit
N∏
j=1,j 6=i
A
θwij
jt , (2)
where N is the number of regions and Ωit measures the region-specific TFP that does
not depend neither on the EU funds nor on the TFP of neighbouring regions, denoted
by Ajt. The parameter θ ∈ [0, 1) measures the strength of the spatial externalities, while
wij ∈ W, weights the spatial externalities from regions j to region i (see Anselin, 2003).
All terms wij are non-stochastic, finite, and such that wij ∈ [0, 1], wij = 0 if i = j, and∑N
j 6=iwij = 1 for i = 1, ..., N . To maintain the maximum flexibility we only assume that
ψ (0) = 1 (i.e. funds are not essential for TFP), and ψ (fi) > 0 for fi > 0 (TFP is always
6The scalar fi could be substituted by a vector of different types of funds received by region i (Objective
1, Objective 2, etc.), allowing each type to have a different effect on production. This aspect will be
considered in the empirical analysis of Section 5.
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positive).
Assume that region-specific TFP is growing at the exogenous rate µ, i.e. Ωit = Ωi0e
µt,
where Ωi0 is the initial level,
7 then (see Appendix A for the proof):
Ait =
N∏
j=1
[ψ (fj) Ωj0]
νij e
µt
1−θ = Ai0e
γAt, (3)
where Ai0 is the initial level of TFP of region i, which also includes the impact of spatial
externalities; νij =
∑∞
r=1 θ
rwij
(r) is the parameter measuring the total spatial externalities
that region i receives from region j; νii = 1 +
∑∞
r=1 θ
rwii
(r) is the parameter quantifying
the total spatial externalities that region i receives from itself, which is equal to 1 (i.e.
there are no spatial externalities from a region to itself) either for θ = 0 or under the
assumption of wij = 0 ∀j; and
γA ≡
µ
1− θ
(4)
is the growth rate of TFP of region i, which increases with the intensity of spatial exter-
nalities θ. Spatial externalities, therefore, have a positive growth effect on regional TFP,
which is the main departure from a standard Solovian exogenous growth model (see Ertur
and Koch, 2007, p. 1038).
The importance of spatial externalities in the analyses of regional growth has been
emphasized by a large literature (see, e.g., Abreu et al., 2004 and Tselios, 2009 for details
and references). Moreover, the view of spatial externalities as technological externalities is
very common (in addition to Bottazzi and Peri, 2003 and Ertur and Koch, 2007, see Lo´pez-
Bazo et al., 2004, Fingleton and Lo´pez-Bazo, 2006, and Elhorst et al., 2010). Finally, in the
literature at country level, Aghion and Jaravel (2015) argue that technological advances
of a country are the result of shifts in its own technological frontier and of imitation of
foreign technology, i.e. of knowledge spillovers.
Vector (wi1, ..., wiN) accounts for the observed cross-section dependence of region i’s
technology on other regions’ technology. Equation (3) should be interpreted as represent-
7Differently, following the literature on endogenous growth, Ertur and Koch (2007) assume that tech-
nological progress is a by-product of the accumulation of physical capital. Moreover, they neglect possible
sources of heterogeneity across regions given by different values of Ωi0.
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ing the outcome of complex phenomena including both the interactions between firms of
different regions and the mobility of workers across different regions. The crucial factors
affecting these phenomena are both geographical proximities and technological proximities
(see Boschma, 2005, Basile et al., 2012, Comin et al., 2012 and Aghion and Jaravel, 2015).
Hence in the empirical analysis we will model the spatial weights matrixW as depending
on the geographical and technological proximity among regions.
As in the standard Solovian growth model, assume that the investment rate of region i
is constant and equal to si and that Lit grows at constant rate ni. Therefore, the equation
describing the accumulation of (per worker) capital of region i, kit ≡ Kit/Lit, is given by:
k˙it = siyit − (δ + ni) kit, (5)
where yit ≡ Yit/Lit is GDP per worker and δ is the depreciation rate of capital (assumed
for the sake of simplicity equal for all regions). From Equations (1), (3), and (5) we can
calculate the equilibrium level of capital in efficiency units, and therefore the equilibrium
level of GDP per efficiency units y˜∞i ≡ y
∞
i /A
∞
i :
y˜∞i =
[
G (fi) si
δ + ni + γA
] α
1−α
. (6)
In the long-run equilibrium (i.e. in the balanced growth path) the growth rate of yi, γ
∞
i ,
is therefore equal to the growth rate of Ai:
γ∞i = γ
A =
µ
1− θ
, (7)
i.e. the intensity of spatial externalities affects the long-run growth rate. Therefore, in
equilibrium the level of funds fi affects only the level of GDP per worker but not the
growth rate.
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5 Empirical Analysis
In this section we use the spatial growth model of Section 4 to estimate the impact of EU
funds on growth of regional per worker GDP. The section is organized as follows: Section
5.1 derives from the theoretical model the econometric specification to be estimated;
Section 5.2 gathers the main results of the estimation; Section 5.3 assesses the effectiveness
of Cohesion Policy on growth and regional disparities.
5.1 From the Theoretical Model to the Econometric Specifica-
tion
Following Durlauf et al. (2005, p. 577), the log-linearization of the dynamics around the
long-run equilibrium allows to express the average growth rate of GDP per worker of
region i in the period [t− τ, t], γit (i.e. τ are the number of years within the period) as:
γit ≈ γ
A + β (ln y˜i,t−τ − ln y˜
∞
it ) , (8)
where β ≡ −
(
1− e−λτ
)
/τ < 0, and λ > 0 measures the rate of convergence of of region
i’s GDP per worker to its equilibrium y˜∞it . The slight difference with respect to Durlauf
et al. (2005) is due to the need to take into account the panel dimension of our analysis.
We have added a time index t to the long-run equilibrium of GDP per worker because in
the panel estimate it may change across different periods (see Shioji, 2001).
Substituting Equations (6) and (3) in Equation (8) (recalling that y˜i,t−τ ≡ yi,t−τ/Ai,t−τ ),
we obtain:
γit ≈ γ
A + β
[
ln yi,t−τ − νii lnψ (fit)Ωi,t−τ −
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
νij lnψ (fjt)Ωj,t−τ+
−
(
α
1− α
)
ln
(
G (fit) sit
δ + nit + γA
)]
, (9)
where fit, sit and nit are respectively the average EU funds, saving rate and growth rate of
employment in the period [t− τ, t]. We assumed that fi,t−τ ≈ fit, that is yearly amounts
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of funds are equal in the period [t− τ, t].
Equation (9) shows that the observed growth rate of GDP per worker of region i
depends on: i) the exogenous growth rate of technological progress γA; ii) the level of
EU funding fit; iii) the region-specific Solovian growth determinants sit and nit; iii) the
initial level of technological progress Ωi,t−τ and GDP per worker yi,t−τ ; and iv) the spa-
tially weighted EU funding and spatially weighted neighbouring regions’ initial levels of
technology
∑N
j=1,j 6=i νij lnψ (fjt)Ωj,t−τ .
From Equation (9) it is possible to identify the direct and indirect effects of EU funds
on the growth rate of GDP per worker of region i (we adopt a terminology used in the
spatial econometrics literature, see LeSage and Pace, 2009, and Section 5.3) corresponding
to the unmediated and mediated effects of funds. In particular, a change in the allocation
of EU funds among the regions affects γit as follows:
dγit =
N∑
j=1
∂γit
∂fjt
dfjt, (10)
i.e.:
dγit = −β
[
N∑
j=1
νijǫψdfjt +
α
1− α
ǫGdfit
]
, (11)
where:
ǫψ ≡
ψ (fjt)
′
ψ (fjt)
and ǫG ≡
G (fjt)
′
G (fjt)
are measures of (absolute) elasticity of ψ (·) and G (·) with respect to fjt. Assuming that
such elasticities are constant, dγit can be expressed as:
dγit = −β
[(
ǫψvii +
α
1− α
ǫG
)
dfit + ǫψ
N∑
j 6=i,j=1
νijdfjt
]
. (12)
Finally, assuming that dfit = dfjt = dft ∀j, we have that the total effect of funds on γit is
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given by:
dγit
dft
= −β
(
ǫψvii +
α
1− α
ǫG
)
− βǫψ
N∑
j 6=i,j=1
νij =
= −β
[
ǫψ
(
1 +
∞∑
r=1
θrwii
(r)
)
+
α
1− α
ǫG
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct effect
−βǫψ
N∑
j 6=i,j=1
∞∑
r=1
θrwij
(r)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect effect
. (13)
The first term in Equation (13) represents the direct effect on γit of an increase in the
funds of region i once the spatial externalities generated by such increase are considered,
while the second term represents the indirect effect on γit of an increase in the funds of
all the other regions. Both the direct and indirect effects positively depend on θ and wij
(remember that β < 0).
Two last steps are needed to complete the specification of the econometric model. The
first consists in adopting a flexible specification of both ψ(·) and G(·) as the following:
ψ (fi,t) = e
η
ψ
1 fi,t+η
ψ
2 f
2
i,t ;
G (fi,t) = e
ηG1 fi,t+η
G
2 f
2
i,t , (14)
which satisfies the restrictions on the shape of G(·) and ψ(·), i.e. G (0) = ψ(0) = 1 and
G(·) > 0 and ψ(·) > 0. In addition, it allows for the presence of nonlinearities, that recent
works have found in the effect of Objective 1 funds (see Becker et al., 2012 and Pellegrini
et al., 2013).
The second is represented by the definition of the initial level of technological progress
Ωi,t−τ which, following Mankiw et al. (1992), should reflect not only technological factors,
but also economy-specific characteristics affecting growth, such as resource endowments,
climate and quality of institutions. Therefore, we assume that:
lnΩi,t−τ = lnΩ + dt−τ + πZi,t−τ , (15)
that is, the heterogeneity in the initial technological levels of regions is the result of the sum
of a constant factor equal across all regions (Ω), a time-dependent factor equal across all
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regions (dt−τ ), capturing possible common trends, and a set of additional control variables
Zi,t−τ (which can also include time-invariant unobservable regional characteristics) specific
to the region.
Substituting Equations (14)-(15) in Equation (9), rearranging terms in order to get an
estimable spatial model, and adding an error term eit to take into account the possibility
of region-specific shocks, with E [eit] = 0 and E [e
2
it] = σ
2
e ∀i, t, leads to (see Appendix B):
γit = µ− β ln Ω− βdt−τ + β ln yi,t−τ − β
[
η1fi,t + η2f
2
i,t
]
+
− β
(
α
1− α
)
ln sit + β
(
α
1− α
)
ln
(
δ + nit + γ
A
)
− βπZi,t−τ +
− θβ
[
N∑
j=1
wij ln yj,t−τ
]
+ θβ
(
α
1− α
)[ N∑
j=1
wij
(
ηG1 fj,t + η
G
2 f
2
j,t
)]
+
+ θβ
(
α
1− α
)[ N∑
j=1
wij ln sj,t
]
− θβ
(
α
1− α
)[ N∑
j=1
wij ln
(
δ + nj,t + γ
A
)]
+
+ θ
N∑
j=1
wijγjt + eit, (16)
where η1 ≡ η
ψ
1 + η
G
1 α/ (1− α) and η2 ≡ η
ψ
2 + η
G
2 α/ (1− α).
Equation (16) can be expressed in matrix form as:
γt = φ0 + φt +XtφX + Zt−τφZ +WXtφWX + θWγt + et, (17)
where γt is the (N×1) vector of average growth rates of GDP per worker in period [t− τ, t];
φ0 includes all constant terms; φt is a time-dummy variable; Xt is the (N ×KX) matrix
of Solovian growth determinants (investment rates, the augmented employment growth
rates and the initial level of GDP per worker) and EU funds of period [t− τ, t]; Zt−τ is
the (N × KZ) matrix of additional control variables, which include also time-constant
unobservable characteristics; W is the row-standardized (N × N) spatial weight matrix
specifying the spatial dependence structure among observations; WXt is the (N ×KX)
matrix of spatially lagged X variables; and Wγt is the endogenous spatial lag variable.
Coefficients φ0, φt, φX , φZ , and φWX are (vectors of) coefficients to be estimated.
Equation (17) represents the basis of the econometric model used in the estimation in
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Section 5.2 below. Its specification, not significantly different from Ertur and Koch (2007),
belongs to the class of Spatial Durbin Models (SDMs) (see Anselin, 1988). According to
our theoretical growth model, an econometric model including only the spatially-lagged
value of the growth rate, as in, e.g., Mohl and Hagen (2010), is therefore plagued by an
omitted variable problem.
5.2 The Estimation of the Model for European Regions
The sample used in the estimations is composed by 175 NUTS2 regions of EU-12 coun-
tries for the period 1991-2008. Our dependent variable is the annual average growth
rate of GDP per worker of a region (see Appendix D for the descriptive statistics). In
our baseline estimation we include as explanatory variables the standard Solovian growth
determinants, i.e. the (log of) initial GDP per worker normalized with respect to sample
average to take into account possible global trends (log.PROD.REL.INI), the (log of) av-
erage annual investment rate (log.INV.RATE), the (log of) average annual employment
growth rate (log.EMP.GR);8 the share of funds on regional GDP with a two-year lag (ei-
ther total funds (SCF), or a breakdown of funds among Cohesion Funds (CF), Objective
1 funds (OB1), Objective 2 funds (OB2), and all the “Other Objectives” funds (Oth-
erOB)). We use a two-year lag when considering the effect of funds on growth to take
into account that the effect of the funds on GDP per worker can be delayed. This also
aims at reducing the possible endogeneity of the funds with respect to the growth rate of
GDP per worker. Finally, a two-year lag allows to exclude from the analysis the recent
severe financial crisis.9 In the robustness checks, following Mankiw et al. (1992), we will
introduce the level of human capital (albeit at national level) as additional determinant
of the equilibrium of GDP per worker.10
8The average growth rate of employment is augmented by the rate of depreciation of capital, but not
by the long-run trend of GDP per worker, as the latter is already taken into account by considering
relative GDP per worker. Given that we have no data on depreciation at regional level, we use the value
of 0.03 proposed by Mankiw et al. (1992).
9Results are robust to alternative specifications of lags (in particular, a three-year lag).
10Mankiw et al. (1992) consider human capital as an additional factor of production, but the unavail-
ability of data on human capital at regional level for the whole period 1991-2008 has suggested us not to
consider this possibility in the theoretical framework from the beginning. As a source of human capital
data at country level we use the index hc provided in the Penn World Table, version 8.0 (see Feenstra
et al., 2015).
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Following Boschma (2005), we test alternative specifications of the spatial weights
matrix. In particular we consider two measures for both geographical proximity and
technological proximity. For geographical proximity we consider two alternative matrices
with row-standardized elements (i, j), which are proportional to the inverse of the great
circle distance between the centroids of regions i and j (matrix WD), or based on travel
times by roads in 1991 (matrixWTT ).11 For technological proximity we consider a matrix
based on the (di)similarity of output composition of regions, denoted by WO, and a
matrix based on the sectoral distribution of patents, denoted by WP (see Basile et al.,
2012, and Marrocu et al., 2013).12 Both matrices proxy for the absorptive capacity of
knowledge by a region, but while WO mainly aims at capturing the capacity of absorbing
existing technologies, WP refers to the capacity of absorbing new technologies (Marrocu
et al., 2013). In addition, we consider the four possible combinations of the two types
of proximities, where distance is given by a geometric weighted mean of the geographical
and technological proximity, with ϕ measuring the weight of geographical proximity (see
Appendix E for more details). The use of matrices computed at the initial period should
make them exogenous with respect to our analysis.
In the estimations the two programming periods I and II are considered as an unique
period because they share a relative homogeneity in the rules governing the allocation
of funds, while these rules significantly changed in the programming period 2000-2006.
Therefore, in the panel analysis we will consider two periods: 1991-2001 and 2002-2008.
The investment rate and employment growth are averaged across the two periods, while
the initial GDP per worker is taken at the beginning of each period. The estimated
models are based on Equation (17), which represents an unrestricted version of the model
in Equation (16).13
11MatrixWTT has been provided by TCP International (https://www.tcp-international.de/en/).
12Data for the calculation of matrix WO are from Cambridge Econometrics (2010), which contains
data on output composition of regions up to 10 sectors in 1992, while in the calculation of matrix
WP we use data on the number of patent applications in 8 sectors in 1991-1993 from Eurostat (http:
//ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/tsc00009).
13Tests for the joint restrictions on coefficients implied by the theoretical model in Equation (16) are
generally rejected. Given that these restrictions strictly depend on the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas
production function, this is not to be considered a relevant drawback in the analysis. In this respect, the
crucial restrictions to be tested in the estimates will be instead the sign of the coefficients.
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Equation (16) suggests to insert in the model both time dummies and fixed effects.
In particular, the introduction of fixed effects is motivated by the fact that unobserved
regional factors that may affect GDP per worker growth such as, for example, institutional
quality and cultural values (which are very stable in time), are very likely to be correlated
with other growth determinants included in the model (e.g. investment rates).
SCF (or the different types of funds) are potentially endogenous. In principle the
allocation of the funds is non-random, but conditional on the regional per capita GDP,
implying a potential reverse causality of GDP per worker growth on funds. Moreover,
the endogeneity of funds could also arise by the measurement error induced by the use
of commitments instead of payments, and by our reassignment of some funds to NUTS2
regions.
We therefore estimate a spatial panel fixed effect model, robust to endogeneity via
two-stage maximum likelihood (see Appendix F for details).14 Appendix F gathers the
details on the instrumental variables used to control for the endogeneity of funds, the
test of endogeneity, and the test of over-identifying restrictions for the validity of the
instrumental variables.
5.2.1 Estimation Results
Table 4 reports the estimated coefficients of three models: Model I, in which funds are
aggregated; Model II, where funds are disaggregated by objectives; and Model III, which
includes human capital among the covariates. The estimates refer to the optimal com-
bination of spatial weights matrices WDO, based on WD and WO with ϕ = 0.8. In
particular, Appendix G shows that for models with disaggregated funds W =WDO with
ϕ = 0.8 minimizes the value of AICc for the four types of possible combinations of the
two types of proximity (i.e. WDO, WTTO, WDP , and WTTP ), for the values of ϕ in the
range [0, 1] (see Anderson, 2007 for the use of AICc for model selection). The estimation
results with individual matrices WD, WTT , WO, and WP are reported in Appendix G.
They show that the sign of coefficients reported in Table 4 are largely robust to alternative
14Murphy and Topel (1985) discuss how the two-stage maximum likelihood procedure provides consis-
tent estimators of the parameters. See also Brunetti et al. (2016) for details.
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specifications of the spatial weights matrix W. In terms of goodness of fit, none of these
specifications outperform the one with WDO and ϕ = 0.8.
The values of the LR test and of the test of over-identifying restrictions (reported
in the last two rows of Table 4) suggest that endogeneity is present in all models and
instruments are valid. Appendix H report the first-stage regressions for the control of
endogeneity for Model II, which represents our preferred specification on the basis of
AICc. The generalized R¯2 never below 0.8 points out that models are able to explain a
large share of the observed variance of growth among the regions. Spatial effects appear
remarkably large: the estimated parameters θ take on values between 0.65 and 0.7 and
are always significant at 5% significance level. European regions of our sample display
conditional convergence as predicted by the theoretical model: the sign of the coefficient of
initial GDP per worker is negative and statistically significant irrespectively of the model
specification. Employment growth has the predicted negative sign, while investment rate
has negative signs but its coefficient is only marginal significant as found in other works
(see, e.g., Fiaschi and Lavezzi, 2007 and Mohl and Hagen, 2010). Model III shows that
including human capital slightly worsen the goodness of fit in terms of the AICc, and
leaves basically unaffected the estimated coefficients of other variables. The sign of the
coefficient of human capital is positive and significant only at 10%.
SCF has a positive and concave significant effect on regional growth. There is also
evidence of a significant effect of the same sign of the spatially-lagged SCF. The disag-
gregation of funds uncovers crucial differences among funds: all types of funds have a
non-significant coefficient, while the coefficients of their spatially-lagged values are signif-
icant for Objective 1 and “Other Objectives” funds, while non-significant for Objective 2
and Cohesion Fund. This evidence suggests that Objective 1 funds have a increasing but
concave effect.15
15As shown by Table 12 in Appendix I the estimation of Model II using the annual growth rate of GDP
per capita as the dependent variable produces similar results.
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Dependent variable Average annual growth rate of GDP per worker
Spatial Matrix WDO(ϕ = 0.8)
Model I II III
Funds SCF All Obj. All Obj.
REGIONAL FE YES YES YES
TIME DUMMIES YES YES YES
log.PROD.REL.IN −0.070
(0.000)
−0.070
(0.000)
−0.067
(0000)
log.INV.RATE −0.007
(0.009)
−0.005
(0.083)
−0.005
(0.111)
log.EMP.GR −0.009
(0.000)
−0.010
(0.000)
−0.010
(0.000)
HC 0.014
(0.056)
W.log.PROD.REL.IN 0.054
(0.000)
0.056
(0.000)
0.045
(0.026)
W.log.INV.RATE −0.035
(0.000)
−0.033
(0.023)
−0.036
(0.012)
W.log.EMP.GR 0.007
(0.363)
0.003
(0.721)
0.004
(0.620)
W.HC −0.026
(0.075)
SCF 0.300
(0.002)
SCF2 −2.780
(0.002)
W.SCF 2.996
(0.000)
W.SCF2 −34.857
(0.000)
OB1 0.148
(0.229)
0.146
(0.237)
OB12 −0.957
(0.456)
−0.802
(0.532)
OB2 0.028
(0.983)
−0.135
(0.919)
OtherOB −0.041
(0.788)
−0.023
(0.883)
CF −0.701
(0.237)
−0.792
(0.179)
W.OB1 2.002
(0.000)
1.965
(0.001)
W.OB12 −33.909
(0.000)
−33.553
(0.000)
W.OB2 5.352
(0.346)
6.704
(0.248)
W.OtherOB 2.811
(0.012)
2.772
(0.020)
W.CF 1.516
(0.644)
1.607
(0.628)
θ 0.660
(0.000)
0.680
(0.000)
0.683
(0.000)
N 350 350 350
AICc -2244.197 -2176.26 -2158.93
Generalized R¯2 0.91 0.90 0.91
LR test of endogeneity 45.241
(0.000)
17.706
(0.060)
18.145
(0.053)
Test of over-identifying restrictions 0.944
(0.419)
1.104
(0.360)
1.083
(0.37)
Table 4: Estimation of Model (16) under different specification of spatial weights matrix and disaggrega-
tion of funds. P-values in parenthesis. Funds with two-year lags. Spatial weights matrices are defined
in Appendix E. Instrumental variables used in the control of endogeneity of funds (lagged funds and in-
struments derived by the three-group method described in Kennedy, 2008), the test of endogeneity, and
the test of over-identifying restrictions for the validity of instrumental variables are discussed in Appendix
F. AICc: Akaike criterion for small samples (see Anderson, 2007). Generalized R¯2: generalization of
R¯2 for ML estimates (see Nagelkerke, 1991).
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5.3 The Effectiveness of Cohesion Policy
In this section we discuss the effectiveness of Cohesion Policy in terms of its impact on
growth and regional disparities on the basis of Model II in Table 4.
Table 5 reports the estimates of the average direct, indirect and total effects of funds
on GDP per worker growth. The average direct effect is the average impact exerted by the
funds on the growth of GDP per worker of recipient regions, which includes the feedback
from other regions who enjoyed externalities from that region; the average indirect effect
is instead the average impact exerted by the funds allocated to neighbour regions through
spatial externalities; the total effect is the sum of two (see LeSage and Pace, 2009). These
represent the estimates of their theoretical counterparts discussed in Section 4 (see, in
particular, Equation (13)).
Model II
Spatial Matrix WDO(ϕ = 0.8)
Average Effects Direct Indirect Total
OB1 0.307
(0.031)
6.413
(0.024)
6.720
(0.021)
OB12 −3.561
(0.028)
−105.410
(0.015)
−108.971
(0.014)
OB2 0.433
(0.785)
16.381
(0.258)
16.814
(0.261)
OtherOB 0.168
(0.360)
8.488
(0.032)
8.656
(0.033)
CF −0.623
(0.349)
3.170
(0.789)
2.547
(0.836)
Table 5: Estimation of average direct, indirect and total effects based on the estimation of Models II in
Table 4. Dependent variable: annual average growth rate of GDP per worker. P-values in parenthesis
are calculated following the Cholesky decomposition proposed by LeSage and Pace (2009).
Both the average direct and indirect effects of Objective 1 funds (and its square) are
significant, leading to a significant positive and concave average total effect of OB1 on
regional growth; “Other Objectives” funds are the only other type of funds having a
significant (indirect and total) positive effect. Overall, (average) indirect effects appear to
play a fundamental role in the explanation of the effect of EU funding on regional growth.
Le Gallo et al. (2011) also estimate direct and indirect effects of funding but, on average,
do not find significant results in the period 1989-1999 for a sample 145 EU regions. When
focusing on local effects, i.e. effects characterizing subset of regions, they find that in
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some regions the effects are significantly positive or significantly negative, while in the
majority of regions they remain non-significant. Their sample and estimation technique
are, however, completely different. On the basis of Equation (13) we can argue that the
positive elasticities of output and TFP to funds, ǫψ and ǫG respectively, are magnified by
the presence of strong spatial externalities, measured by the estimate of θ.
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Figure 1: Estimated average total effect on
GDP per worker growth of Objective 1 funds
(gray area represents 95% confidence interval)
from Model II in Table 4. Vertical dash-dotted
line represents the sample average of the funds.
Other objectives funds on GDP (log scale)
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Figure 2: Estimated average total effect on the
GDP per worker growth of Other objectives
funds (gray area represents 95% confidence in-
terval) of Model II in Table 4. Vertical dash-
dotted line represents the sample average of the
funds.
Figures 1 and 2 provide a graphical illustration of the average total effect of Objective
1 and “Other Objectives” funds respectively with their 95% confidence bands. Figure 1
shows that Objective 1 funds have an optimal size, which we quantify at approximately
3% of regional GDP. In addition, there exists a threshold at about 4% after which Ob-
jective 1 funds have no significant effects. Becker et al. (2012) find a similar result, but
they estimate such threshold at 1.8%, for a sample of 1091 EU15 NUTS3 regions in the
1994-1999 programming period and 1213 EU 25 NUTS3 regions in the 2000-2006 pro-
gramming period. They, however, consider the effect on per capita GDP growth and,
more importantly, neglect spatial externalities. For a sample of 122 NUTS-1/NUTS-2
regions over the period 1995-2005 Hagen and Mohl (2008), adopting an empirical strat-
egy similar to Becker et al. (2012), find a concave but non-significant effect of Objective
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1 funds on per capita GDP growth. Also in this case the role of spatial externalities of
funds is substantially neglected.
Focusing only on funds with statistically significant effects, Table 6 shows that sub-
stantial gains in the effectiveness of Cohesion Policy occurred between the two periods
1991-2001 and 2002-2008. The estimated effect of Objective 1 funds on the median re-
gional growth rate of GDP per worker (∆γOB1) is, in fact, 0.24% in the first period and
0.37% in the second,16 while the corresponding values of the (median) Objective-1 funds
multiplier (multOB1) are 0.45 and 1.52 respectively (these differences are highly statisti-
cally significant).17 The changes in the management of Structural and Cohesion Funds
between the two periods provide a possible explanation of this rise over time of Objective-
1 funds multiplier. In particular, Alegre (2012) and Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Novak (2013)
contain a thorough discussion of the refinements in the rules governing the allocation and
the use of funds between the two periods, emphasizing the attempt to limit the crowding-
out of funds on other public investments and, in general, the implementation of better
practices in the allocation and management of funds.
Model II
Spatial Matrix WDO(ϕ = 0.8)
Sample median
Period 1991-2001 2002-2008 Difference
∆γOB1 0.0024
[0.0014]
0.0037
[0.0017]
0.0013
(0.000)
∆γOtherOB 0.0079
[0.0039]
0.0005
[0.0002]
−0.0074
(0.000)
multOB1 0.45
[0.54]
1.52
[0.70]
1.0629
(0.001)
Table 6: The estimated median effect on regional annual growth rate of GDP per worker of Objective 1
(∆γOB1) and “Other Objectives” (∆γOtherOB) funds, the median Objective-1 funds multiplier (multOB1)
in the two periods 1991-2001 and 2002-2008 (standard errors in square brackets), and the bootstrap test
of difference of medians (p-value in parenthesis).
16We prefer to take as main index of effectiveness of funds the median instead of average regional
growth due to the high skewness of the distribution of Objective 1 funds.
17The Objective-1 funds multiplier of region i over the period [t− τ, t] is calculated as:
multOB1it ≡
Y OB1it − Yi,t−τ
OB1it
≡
∆Y OB1it
OB1it
= ∆γOB1it
(
Yi,t−τ
OB1it
)
(1 + nit) +
(
Yi,t−τ
OB1it
)
nit,
where OB1it is the total amount of Objective 1 funds, ∆γ
OB1
it ≡ ∆Y
OB1
it /Lit/ (Yi,t−τ/Li,t−τ ) the addi-
tional growth of GDP per worker in region i due to Objective 1 funds, and nit ≡ ∆Lit/Li,t−τ is the
growth rate of employment of region i in period [t− τ, t].
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The effectiveness of “Other Objectives” funds considerably decreased from 0.79% to
0.06% between the two periods (this difference is highly statistically significant) as the
result of the strong reduction in the amount of this type of funds in 2000-2006 (see Table
2).18
As regards the reduction of regional disparities, Figures 3 and 5 show the geographical
concentration of funds: both Objective 1 and the total amount of funds are mainly allo-
cated to the regions of the Southern Europe (Spain, Portugal, Southern Italy, and Greece)
plus Ireland. The differences in the intensity of funds are marked: the top quintile in the
distribution of total funds (as a ratio to the level of GDP) ranges from 0.77% to 7.92%
with a sample median of 0.12%.19 Figures 4 and 6, instead, present the distribution of
additional annual growth across the regions of our sample.
The comparison between Figures 3-4 and Figures 5-6 highlights the striking effects
of spatial externalities, as several regions not receiving funding had a non-negligible ad-
ditional growth. Overall, the effect of the Cohesion Policy on regional GDP per worker
appears less geographically concentrated and less unequal with respect to funds’ alloca-
tion, although a strong asymmetry of the benefits remains: the sample median of the
estimated additional growth of GDP per worker is equal to 1.4%, while additional growth
in the top quintile ranges from 3.5% to 5.6%. All the regions in the top quintile belongs to
Portugal, Spain, Southern Italy and Greece, while the regions in the bottom quintile are
in the core of Europe. The picture is fairly different from the one proposed by Le Gallo
et al. (2011) on the spatial distribution of the benefits of EU Cohesion Policy, as they find
significant positive effects only in the regions of UK, Southern Italy and Greece.
Finally, the comparison between the distribution of GDP per worker in 2008 and the
counterfactual distribution obtained assuming that no EU funding took place20 reported
in Figure 7, highlights the effectiveness of the Cohesion Policy in acting against the process
18In Table 6 we do not report the estimate of “Other-Objectives” funds multiplier because the limited
amount of this type of funds (just the 3% of total amount of funds in 2000-2006) makes such estimate
not reliable.
19In particular, for each of the three programming periods we computed the ratios between the total
amount of funds of the period and the initial level of GDP of each programming period; then, we summed
the three ratios and took their annual average.
20In particular, the counterfactual distribution is calculated by applying to the GDP per worker in
1991 of each region its estimated growth rate from Model II in Table 4, setting to zero the level of funds.
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[0.0164 − 0.1041]
Figure 3: Map of the intensity of Objective 1
funding expressed by the average annual ratio
of Objective 1 funds to GDP in the period 1991-
2008.
[6e−04 − 0.0024)
[0.0024 − 0.0101)
[0.0101 − 0.0129)
[0.0129 − 0.0243)
[0.0243 − 0.0561]
Figure 4: Map of the estimated additional an-
nual growth of GDP per worker ascribable to
Objective 1 funds in the period 1991-2008 cal-
culated from Model II in Table 4.
[0 − 5e−04)
[5e−04 − 0.0011)
[0.0011 − 0.0038)
[0.0038 − 0.0164)
[0.0164 − 0.1041]
Figure 5: Map of the intensity of total funding
expressed by the average annual ratio of total funds
to GDP in the period 1991-2008.
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[0.0024 − 0.0101)
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[0.0243 − 0.0561]
Figure 6: Map of the estimated additional annual
growth of GDP per worker ascribable to total funds
in the period 1991-2008 calculated from Model II
in Table 4.
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Figure 7: The actual versus the counterfactual distribution of GDP per worker in 2008. The counterfactual
distribution is calculated by Model II in Table 4 assuming no contribution of funds to regional growth.
of polarization. According to our estimates, if no funds were allocated over the period
1989-2006 the dispersion of the GDP per worker distribution in 2008 would have been
higher by 8 basis points (i.e. the Gini index would have taken on a value of from 0.21
instead of 0.13).
6 Concluding Remarks
Our analysis of EU Cohesion Policy allows to address several policy issues raised over time.
We provided evidence of a significant effectiveness of the EU Cohesion Policy in the period
1989-2006 in terms of two of its major goals: the increase in regional competitiveness, as
measured by the additional annual growth of GDP per worker, which we have quantified
for our sample in a median increase of 1.4%, and the reduction of the regional disparities,
as measured by the induced decline in Gini index, which we have estimated equal to 8 basis
points. This effectiveness is affected by strong spatial spillovers. We found evidence of a
significant difference in the effect of the policy over programming periods. In particular,
we estimated a median multiplier of Objective 1 funds equal to 1.52 in the period 2002-
2008, a much higher value than 0.45, estimated for the period 1991-2001. This result,
at least for Objective 1 funds, is consistent with the claim of Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Novak
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(2013) about a “learning process” in the design of the policy.
Our investigation allows to draw further relevant conclusions for the design of future
Cohesion Policy, which appear in line with the suggestions of Barca (2009) and Pien´kowski
and Berkowitz (2015). First, Cohesion Policy should be focused on a restricted number
of “core priorities” (Barca, 2009), given the evidence that only Objective 1 and the other
funds different from Objective 2 and Cohesion funds seems to have had significant effects.
Second, the geographical concentration of funds should be favoured, given the presence
of significant positive spatial externalities of funds. Third, funds should be more equally
allocated across the targeted regions, given the estimated concave effect of Objective 1
funds.
Finally, our findings point to a trade-off between the two goals of EU Cohesion Policy
of increasing overall growth and reducing inequalities, which have been already remarked
by several authors for the past programming periods (see, e.g., Farole et al., 2011, and
Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Novak, 2013). In particular, Southern European regions are both the
most peripheral and the poorest. If their economic backwardness and distance from the
core of Europe would suggest to allocate to them most of funds to reduce inequalities, the
decreasing marginal effect of Objective 1 funds on GDP per worker and their lower (pos-
itive) spatial externalities would suggest the opposite to increase overall growth. Barca
(2009) contains several insights on how Cohesion Policy should be designed to manage this
trade-off from the social and political perspectives. The allocation of European Structural
and Investment Funds for the period 2014-2020 has partially incorporated such recom-
mendations, in particular adopting the “smart specialization” concept, which aims at:
“promoting innovation in a wide variety of regional settings, and in particular in the het-
erogeneous environment of European Union (EU) regions” (McCann and Ortega-Argile´s,
2015).21 Our estimates could provide a complementary contribution in terms of quanti-
tative estimates of such trade-off for possible alternative patterns of funds’ allocation.
Our analysis presents some limitations. First, we consider a subset of current recipients
of EU funds (even though our sample covers about 70% of total funds). Moreover, the
21See also Foray (2014) for a detailed review of the concept of smart specialization and its application
to EU Cohesion Policy.
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(relatively) low number of observations limited the possibility to test whether the funds
of the last programming period had a different (marginal) impact, and whether such an
impact can be conditioned to other regional characteristics. In turn, these limitations
suggest some of the most promising lines of future research, which include the extension
of the sample to new entrant countries; a more detailed analysis of the differential impact
EU policy across programming periods, given the radical changes occurring in the most
recent years; and, finally, the investigation of the factors enhancing the effectiveness of
funds, as the composition of regional output and the quality of institutions. In this respect
Becker et al. (2013) and Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Garcilazo (2015) reports a substantial impact
of regional institutional quality on the returns of EU policy.
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Appendix
A Derivation of the Level of Technology of a Region
The technological level of region i at time t, Ait, is given by:
Ait = ψ (fi) Ωit
N∏
j 6=i
A
θwij
jt . (18)
Taking Equation (18) in logs we obtain:
lnAit = lnψ (fi)Ωit + θ
N∑
j=1
wij lnAjt. (19)
Then, rewriting Equation (19) in matrix form we obtain:
A˜t = Ω˜t + θWA˜t, (20)
where A˜t is the (N × 1) vector of logarithms of technological progress at period t, Ω˜t is
the (N × 1) vector of logarithms of ψ (fi) Ωit, andW is the (N ×N) Markov matrix with
friction terms wij. Solving for A˜t returns:
A˜t = (I− θW)
−1Ω˜t, (21)
where I is the (N ×N) identity matrix. From Equation (21), under the assumption that
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|θ| < 1, the technological progress of region i can be expressed as:
Ait = ψ (fi)Ωit
N∏
j=1
[ψ (fj) Ωjt]
∑
∞
r=1 θ
rw
(r)
ij =
= ψ (fi)Ωit[ψ (fi) Ωit]
∑
∞
r=1 θ
rw
(r)
ii
N∏
j=1,j 6=i
[ψ (fj) Ωjt]
∑
∞
r=1 θ
rw
(r)
ij =
= [ψ (fi)Ωit]
1+
∑
∞
r=1 θ
rw
(r)
ii
N∏
j=1,j 6=i
[ψ (fj) Ωjt]
∑
∞
r=1 θ
rw
(r)
ij =
= [ψ (fi)Ωit]
νii
N∏
j=1,j 6=i
[ψ (fj)Ωjt]
νij ,
where the terms w
(r)
ij are the elements of row i and column j of matrix W to the power
of r, νii = 1 +
∑∞
r=1 θ
rwii
(r) and νij =
∑∞
r=1 θ
rwij
(r). Assuming Ωit = Ωi0e
µt we obtain:
Ait =
[
ψ (fi) Ωi0e
µt
]νii N∏
j=1,j 6=i
[
ψ (fj) Ωj0e
µt
]νij . (22)
Taking Equation (22) in logs, we have:
lnAit = νii ln [ψ (fi)Ωi0] + νiiµt+
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
νij ln [ψ (fj)Ωj0] +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
νijµt =
= νii ln [ψ (fi)Ωi0] + µt+ µt
∞∑
r=1
θrwii
(r) +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
νij ln [ψ (fj) Ωj0] + µt
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
∞∑
r=1
θrwij
(r) =
= νii ln [ψ (fi)Ωi0] +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
νij ln [ψ (fj) Ωj0] +
[
1 +
∞∑
r=1
θr
N∑
j=1
wij
(r)
]
µt =
= νii ln [ψ (fi)Ωi0] +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
νij ln [ψ (fj) Ωj0] +
(
1
1− θ
)
µt, (23)
given the Markovian property that
∑N
j=1wij
(r) = 1 for each r. Finally, taking the expo-
nential of Equation (23) we obtain Equation (3).
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B Derivation of the Average Growth Rate of GDP
per Worker
Since νii = 1 +
∑∞
r=1 θ
rwii
(r) and νij =
∑∞
r=1 θ
rwij
(r), Equation (9) can be rewritten as:
γit ≈ γ
A + β ln yi,t−τ − β lnψ (fi,t)− β ln Ωi,t−τ +
− β
(
α
1− α
)[
lnG (fit) + ln sit − ln(δ + nit + γ
A)
]
+
− β
N∑
j=1
∞∑
r=1
θrw
(r)
ij lnψ (fj,t)− β
N∑
j=1
∞∑
r=1
θrw
(r)
ij ln Ωj,t−τ . (24)
Rewriting Equation (24) in matrix form and pre-multiply all terms by (I− θW) leads to:
(I− θW)γt = γ
A (I− θW)1 + β (I− θW) y˜t−τ − β
(
α
1− α
)
(I− θW)
(
G˜t + s˜t − n˜t
)
+
− βψ˜t − βΩ˜t−τ , (25)
where γt is the (N×1) vector of average growth rates of GDP per worker, 1 is the (N×1)
vector of ones, y˜t−τ is the (N × 1) vector of the log of initial GDP per worker in period
[t− τ, t], ψ˜t is the (N × 1) vector of the log of ψ (·), G˜t is the (N × 1) vector of the log
of G (·), s˜t is the (N × 1) vector of the log of investment rates, n˜t is the (N × 1) vector
of the log of employment growth rates augmented by δ and γA and Ω˜t−τ is the (N × 1)
vector of the log of initial level of technology.
Therefore, the growth rate of GDP per worker of region i in period [t− τ, t] corresponds
to the i-th element of γt (remember that (I− θW)1 = (1− θ) 1 and γ
A = µ/ (1− θ))
and will be given by:
γit ≈ µ+ β ln yi,t−τ − θβ
[
N∑
j=1
wij ln yj,t−τ
]
− β
(
α
1− α
)[
lnG (fit) + ln sit − ln
(
δ + nit + γ
A
)]
+
+ θβ
(
α
1− α
)[ N∑
j=1
wij lnG (fjt) +
N∑
j=1
wij ln sjt −
N∑
j=1
wij ln
(
δ + njt + γ
A
)]
+
− β lnψ (fi,t)− β ln Ωi,t−τ + θ
[
N∑
j=1
wijγjt
]
. (26)
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Substituting Equations (14)-(15) in Equation (26) leads to:
γit ≈ µ− β ln Ω− βdt−τ + β ln yi,t−τ − β
[
η1fi,t + η2f
2
i,t
]
+
− β
(
α
1− α
)
ln sit + β
(
α
1− α
)
ln
(
δ + nit + γ
A
)
− βπZi,t−τ +
− θβ
[
N∑
j=1
wij ln yj,t−τ
]
+ θβ
(
α
1− α
)[ N∑
j=1
wij
(
ηG1 fj,t + η
G
2 f
2
j,t
)]
+
+ θβ
(
α
1− α
)[ N∑
j=1
wij ln sj,t
]
− θβ
(
α
1− α
)[ N∑
j=1
wij ln
(
δ + nj,t + γ
A
)]
+
+ θ
N∑
j=1
wijγjt (27)
where η1 ≡ η
ψ
1 + α/ (1− α) η
G
1 and η2 ≡ η
ψ
2 + α/ (1− α) η
G
2 .
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C List of NUTS2 Regions in the Sample
BE1 Re´g. Bruxelles DK01 Hovedstaden FR81 Languedoc-Roussillon NL12 Friesland UKJ1 Berkshire, Buckinghamshire
BE21 Antwerpen DK02 Sjlland FR82 Prov.-Alpes-Coˆte d’Azur NL13 Drenthe and Oxfordshire
BE22 Limburg (B) DK03 Southern Denmark FR83 Corse NL21 Overijssel UKJ2 Surrey, East, West Sussex
BE23 Oost-Vlaanderen DK04 Midtjylland GR11 Anatoliki Mak., Thraki NL22 Gelderland UKJ3 Hampshire, Isle of Wight
BE24 Vlaams Brabant DK05 Nordjylland GR12 Kentriki Makedonia NL31 Utrecht UKJ4 Kent
BE25 West-Vlaanderen ES11 Galicia GR13 Dytiki Makedonia NL32 Noord-Holland UKK1 Gloucestershire, Wiltshire
BE31 Brabant Wallon ES12 Principado de Asturias GR14 Thessalia NL33 Zuid-Holland and North Somerset
BE32 Hainaut ES13 Cantabria GR21 Ipeiros NL34 Zeeland UKK2 Dorset, Somerset
BE33 Lie`ge ES21 Pais Vasco GR22 Ionia Nisia NL41 Noord-Brabant UKK3 Cornwall, Isles of Scilly
BE34 Luxembourg (B) ES22 Comunidad de Navarra GR23 Dytiki Ellada NL42 Limburg (NL) UKK4 Devon
BE35 Namur ES23 La Rioja GR24 Sterea Ellada PT11 Norte UKL1 West Wales, The Valleys
DE11 Stuttgart ES24 Arago´n GR25 Peloponnisos PT12 Centro (P) UKL2 East Wales
DE12 Karlsruhe ES3 Comunidad de Madrid GR3 Attiki PT13 Lisboa, Vale do Tejo UKM1 North Eastern Scotland
DE13 Freiburg ES41 Castilla y Leo´n GR41 Voreio Aigaio PT14 Alentejo UKM2 Eastern Scotland
DE14 Tu¨bingen ES42 Castilla-la Mancha GR42 Notio Aigaio PT15 Algarve UKM3 South Western Scotland
DE21 Oberbayern ES43 Extremadura GR43 Kriti PT2 Ac¸ores UKM4 Highlands and Islands
DE22 Niederbayern ES51 Catalua IE01 Border, Mid., Western PT3 Madeira UKN Northern Ireland
DE23 Oberpfalz ES52 Comunidad Valenciana IE02 Southern and Eastern UKC1 Tees Valley
DE24 Oberfranken ES53 Islas Baleares ITC1 Piemonte UKC2 Northumberland
DE25 Mittelfranken ES61 Andalucia ITC2 Valle d’Aosta UKD1 Cumbria
DE26 Unterfranken ES62 Regio´n de Murcia ITC3 Liguria UKD2 Cheshire
DE27 Schwaben ES64 Melilla ITC4 Lombardia UKD3 Greater Manchester
DE5 Bremen FR1 Ile de France ITD1 Bolzano UKD4 Lancashire
DE6 Hamburg FR21 Champagne-Ardenne ITD2 Trento UKD5 Merseyside
DE71 Darmstadt FR22 Picardie ITD3 Veneto UKE1 East Riding, North Lincol.
DE72 Gießen FR23 Haute-Normandie ITD4 Friuli-Venezia Giulia UKE2 North Yorkshire
DE73 Kassel FR24 Centre ITD5 Emilia-Romagna UKE3 South Yorkshire
DE91 Braunschweig FR25 Basse-Normandie ITE1 Toscana UKE4 West Yorkshire
DE92 Hannover FR26 Bourgogne ITE2 Umbria UKF1 Derbyshire, Nottingh.
DE93 Lu¨neburg FR3 Nord Pas-de-Calais ITE3 Marche UKF2 Leicestershire, Rutland
DE94 Weser-Ems FR41 Lorraine ITE4 Lazio and Northamptonshire
DEA1 Du¨sseldorf FR42 Alsace ITF1 Abruzzo UKF3 Lincolnshire
DEA2 Ko¨ln FR43 Franche-Comte´ ITF2 Molise UKG1 Herefordshire, Worcest.
DEA3 Mu¨nster FR51 Pays de la Loire ITF3 Campania and Warwickshire
DEA4 Detmold FR52 Bretagne ITF4 Puglia UKG2 Shropshire and Staffordshire
DEA5 Arnsberg FR53 Poitou-Charentes ITF5 Basilicata UKG3 West Midlands
DEB1 Koblenz FR61 Aquitaine ITF6 Calabria UKH1 East Anglia
DEB2 Trier FR62 Midi-Pyre´ne´es ITG1 Sicilia UKH2 Bedfordshire, Hertford.
DEB3 Rheinhessen-Pfalz FR63 Limousin ITG2 Sardegna UKH3 Essex
DEC Saarland FR71 Rhoˆne-Alpes LU Luxembourg UKI1 Inner London
DEF Schleswig-Holstein FR72 Auvergne NL11 Groningen UKI2 Outer London
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D Descriptive Statistics of Variables
GDPpwGr log.PROD.REL.IN log.INV.RATE log.EMP.GR HC
Min -0.0190 -1.1462 -1.9588 -4.0020 2.3399
Median 0.0110 0.0206 -1.4966 -3.2879 2.7663
Mean 0.0113 -0.0221 -1.4699 -3.2879 2.8304
Max 0.0476 0.5582 -0.8323 -2.6474 3.2528
St.Dev. 0.0100 0.2564 0.2007 0.2006 0.1944
SCF CF OB1 OB2 OtherOB
Min 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Median 0.0011 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002
Mean 0.0067 0.0009 0.0048 0.0003 0.0007
Max 0.1041 0.0229 0.0882 0.0023 0.0276
St.Dev. 0.0142 0.0025 0.0119 0.0004 0.0018
Table 7: Mean and standard deviation of the variables used in the estimates.
GDPpwGr log.PROD.REL.IN log.INV.RATE log.EMP.GR HC
GDPpwGr 1 0 -0.26 -0.33 -0.11
log.PROD.REL.IN 0 1 -0.49 0.02 0.37
log.INV.RATE -0.26 -0.49 1 0.21 -0.05
log.EMP.GR -0.33 0.02 0.21 1 0.04
HC -0.11 0.37 -0.05 0.04 1
SCF 0.12 -0.67 0.45 0.04 -0.27
CF 0.02 -0.63 0.45 0.15 -0.18
OB1 0.14 -0.65 0.44 0.01 -0.26
OB2 -0.22 0.09 -0.06 -0.01 0.06
OtherOB 0.08 -0.15 0.09 0.09 -0.22
SCF CF OB1 OB2 OtherOB
GDPpwGr 0.12 0.02 0.14 -0.22 0.08
log.PROD.REL.IN -0.67 -0.63 -0.65 0.09 -0.15
log.INV.RATE 0.45 0.45 0.44 -0.06 0.09
log.EMP.GR 0.04 0.15 0.01 -0.01 0.09
HC -0.27 -0.18 -0.26 0.06 -0.22
SCF 1 0.86 0.98 -0.21 0.29
CF 0.86 1 0.8 -0.16 0.19
OB1 0.98 0.8 1 -0.26 0.15
OB2 -0.21 -0.16 -0.26 1 -0.03
OtherOB 0.29 0.19 0.15 -0.03 1
Table 8: Correlations between the variables used in the estimates.
47
E Spatial Weights Matrices
In the empirical analysis we always use a row-standardized spatial weights matrix W
whose element wij are defined as a (negative) function of the distance between region i
and region j (dij), that is (see Anselin (2001, pp. 312-313) for a general discussion on
spatial weights matrices):
wij = w
∗
ij/
∑
j
w∗ij
with
w∗ij =


0 if i = j
d−2ij if i 6= j.
In particular, in the estimation we use three types of measure of proximity.
1. In the first dij is defined in geographical terms and is equal to: i) the great circle
distance between the centroids of regions i and j (as in Ertur and Koch, 2007, p.
1043), denoted by dDij ; or ii) to the fastest travel time between the administrative
centres of regions i and j for passengers using roads, denoted by dTTij ;
2. in the second dij is defined in technological terms and is equal to: i)
∑Q
q=1 (sqi − sqj)
2 /Q,
where siq is the share of output of sector q in region i, and Q is the total number
of sectors of economy, denoted by dOij; or ii) 1 − 0.5
∑Q
q=1 |pqi − pqj |, where piq is
the share of patents in sector q in region i, and Q is the total number of sectors of
economy, denoted by dPij ;
3. in the third, denoted by dGTij , dij is the result of a combination of the previous two
types and equal to
(
d˜Gij
)ϕ (
d˜Tij
)(1−ϕ)
, with ϕ ∈ [0, 1] and d˜Gij (based on either d
D
ij or
dTTij ) and d˜
T
ij (based on either d
O
ij or d
P
ij) representing the standardized geographical
and technological proximity respectively (in particular we standardize the log of
distance and then take the exponential of the standardized value in order to maintain
the non negativity in the measure of proximity).
Following Anderson (2007), we choose ϕ minimizing the AICc of the estimate.
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F Endogeneity Test and Two-Stage Maximum Like-
lihood Estimation
To control for the potential endogeneity of SCF (or the different types of funds) we
estimate a spatial panel fixed effect model robust to endogeneity using the following
instruments:
• For SCF we use two instruments. The first instrument is the lagged value of SCF,
that is the value of SCF in the period 1975-1988 for the unique period composed
of Periods I and II and the value of SCF in 1994-1999 for Period III. The second
instrument is derived by the three-group method described in Kennedy (2008), in
which the instrumental variable takes on values -1, 0 or 1 if the potentially endoge-
nous variable is respectively in the top, middle or bottom third of its ranking. This
instrument is usually utilized when variables are subject to measurement error, as
in our case.
• For SCF2 we take as instruments the square of the instruments for SCF as suggested
by Wooldridge (2010).
• For W.SCF and W.SCF2 we use the spatial lag of the instruments of SCF and SCF2,
as well as the instruments derived by the three-group method.
• For each type of funds (CF, OB1, OB2, OtherOB) we always use two instruments
as for SCF, i.e. its lagged values and the three-group method; however, given that
no break down of funds is present for the period 1975-1988 for funds relative to the
unique period composed of Periods I and II, we always used the total amount of
funds, while we used the specific lagged value of funds for Period III.
To perform the endogeneity test we use the Control Function method (CFM) (see
Wooldridge, 2010, pp. 352-354). The CFM treats endogeneity as an omitted variable
problem, where the inclusion of estimated first-stage residuals as a covariate corrects the
inconsistency of the regression of the dependent variable on the endogenous explanatory
variable. CFM provides consistent estimation of the underlying regression coefficients.
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Therefore, according to CFM we use a two-stage procedure: i) first we regress each
endogenous variable on the exogenous variables and the instruments; then, ii) we insert
the first-stage residuals in the original regression. Consistently with the two-stage max-
imum likelihood estimation, in the first-stage regressions we do not consider any spatial
dependence and, therefore, we estimate a fixed effect panel linear model. On the contrary,
in the second-stage regression we consider the model in Equation (17). In particular, in
the second-stage regression we insert all the spatially lagged exogenous and endogenous
variables as well as the residuals of the first-stage regressions.
Finally, a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test is conducted to test that the residuals in the
second-stage regression are jointly equal to zero. If the null hypothesis can be rejected
at the usual level of significance, we estimate the model using a two-stage maximum
likelihood estimation (TSML), which consists in: i) a first step where each potentially
endogenous variable (i.e. all endogenous variables but the spatially-lagged dependent
variable) is regressed on the exogenous variables and the instruments; and ii) a second
step where the fitted values of the first-stage regressions are used in the original regression
with spatially-lagged dependent variable, which is estimated using standard maximum
likelihood. In the first-stage regressions we neglect spatial dependence and use the fixed
effect estimator, while in the second-stage regression we estimate the model in Equation
(17) via maximum likelihood. The second-step estimation is performed with the package
splm in R Core Team (2015) (see Millo and Piras, 2012).
The test of over-identifying restrictions for the validity of instruments is performed
following the procedure in Wooldridge (2010, pp. 354-355), which allows to test if the
time-demeaned extra instruments are uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic errors in all time
periods, without assuming that they are uncorrelated with historical factors contained in
the fixed effects.
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G Estimates with Alternative Measures of Geograph-
ical and Technological Proximity
Figure 8 reports the value of AICc for the four types of possible combinations of the two
types of proximity (WDO, WTTO, WDP , and WTTP ) for alternative values of ϕ. The
minimum AICc is reached for WDO with ϕ = 0.8.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
−
21
50
−
21
00
−
20
50
−
20
00
ϕ
AI
Cc
WDO
WTTO
WDP
WTTP
Figure 8: AICc of Model II in Table 4 estimated under different specification of spatial weights matrix
W.
Table 9 reports the estimates with WD, WTT , WO and WP respectively.
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Dependent variable Average annual growth rate of GDP per worker
Spatial Matrix WD WTT WO WP
Model I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Funds SCF All Obj. SCF All Obj. SCF All Obj. SCF All Obj.
REGIONAL FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
TIME DUMMIES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
log.PROD.REL.IN −0.067
(0.000)
−0.069
(0.000)
−0.070
(0.000)
−0.070
(0.000)
−0.073
(0.000)
−0.084
(0.000)
−0.064
(0.000)
−0.062
(0.000)
log.INV.RATE −0.007
(0.010)
−0.004
(0.129)
−0.005
(0.072)
−0.007
(0.034)
−0.006
(0.112)
0.005
(0.246)
−0.011
(0.002)
−0.014
(0.000)
log.EMP.GR −0.011
(0.000)
−0.011
(0.000)
−0.012
(0.000)
−0.011
(0.000)
−0.013
(0.000)
−0.013
(0.000)
−0.019
(0.000)
−0.023
(0.000)
W.log.PROD.REL.IN 0.041
(0.000)
0.028
(0.055)
0.055
(0.000)
0.031
(0.064)
0.039
(0.027)
−0.043
(0.089)
0.042
(0.004)
−0.008
(0.682)
W.log.INV.RATE −0.035
(0.000)
−0.021
(0.064)
−0.030
(0.000)
−0.009
(0.586)
0.002
(0.889)
0.053
(0.002)
−0.021
(0.047)
0.006
(0.706)
W.log.EMP.GR 0.013
(0.046)
0.015
(0.067)
0.016
(0.037)
0.018
(0.039)
−0.012
(0.182)
0.015
(0.147)
0.001
(0.871)
0.010
(0.262)
SCF 0.305
(0.002)
0.239
(0.016)
0.604
(0.000)
1.136
(0.000)
SCF2 −3.004
(0.001)
−2.476
(0.009)
−6.135
(0.000)
−10.200
(0.000)
W.SCF 2.848
(0.000)
2.869
(0.000)
1.486
(0.010)
−2.536
(0.000)
W.SCF2 −31.686
(0.000)
−30.316
(0.000)
−19.147
(0.007)
17.701
(0.000)
OB1 0.157
(0.202)
0.161
(0.198)
0.607
(0.001)
0.981
(0.000)
OB12 −0.805
(0.537)
−0.898
(0.450)
−4.358
(0.026)
−8.602
(0.000)
OB2 0.024
(0.986)
−0.052
(0.971)
−2.799
(0.130)
−1.402
(0.435)
OtherOB 0.015
(0.921)
0.069
(0.658)
0.409
(0.041)
0.465
(0.130)
CF −0.972
(0.118)
−1.297
(0.046)
−3.909
(0.001)
−1.708
(0.017)
W.OB1 1.127
(0.047)
1.767
(0.010)
4.473
(0.000)
−5.855
(0.000)
W.OB12 −18.988
(0.016)
−24.475
(0.014)
−45.456
(0.000)
55.272
(0.000)
W.OB2 4.657
(0.411)
3.197
(0.660)
−11.627
(0.185)
17.140
(0.122)
W.OtherOB 4.345
(0.000)
4.056
(0.000)
−0.899
(0.657)
−4.249
(0.021)
W.CF −0.446
(0.866)
−6.227
(0.113)
−21.542
(0.000)
4.209
(0.002)
θ 0.645
(0.000)
0.654
(0.000)
0.723
(0.000)
0.673
(0.000)
0.315
(0.001)
0.204
(0.040)
0.343
(0.000)
0.282
(0.001)
N 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350
AICc -2233.444 -2171.465 -2185.631 -2139.76 -2003.763 -1977.948 -2043.048 -2041.575
Generalized R¯2 0.9 0.9 0.89 0.89 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.85
LR test of endogeneity 41.368
(0.000)
17.623
(0.062)
31.880
(0.000)
23.647
(0.009)
21.496
(0.000)
43.465
(0.000)
52.214
(0.000)
70.811
(0.000)
Test of over-identifying restrictions 0.977
(0.404)
1.199
(0.303)
1.187
(0.315)
0.793
(0.594)
0.557
(0.643)
0.510
(0.827)
0.869
(0.457)
0.552
(0.794)
Table 9: Estimation of Model (16) under additional specifications of spatial weights matrix and disag-
gregation of funds. P-values in parenthesis. Funds with two-year lags. Spatial weights matrices are
defined in Appendix E. Instrumental variables used in the control of endogeneity of funds (lagged funds
and instruments derived by the three-group method described in Kennedy, 2008), the test of endogene-
ity, and the test of over-identifying restrictions for the validity of instrumental variables are discussed
in Appendix F. AICc: Akaike criterion for small samples (see Anderson, 2007). Generalized R¯2:
generalization of R¯2 for ML estimates (see Nagelkerke, 1991).
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H First-stage regressions
Dependent variable:
CF OB1 OB12 OB2 OtherOB
log.PROD.REL.IN 0.001 −0.007∗∗∗ −0.0002∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗ −0.00003
log.INV.RATE 0.001 0.004∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0002 0.0001
log.EMP.GR −0.001 0.001 −0.00000 0.0002∗ 0.0002
W.log.PROD.REL.IN −0.005 0.003 0.0002 0.001∗∗ 0.0002
W.log.INV.RATE −0.005 −0.006 −0.0002 0.0004 −0.001
W.log.EMP.GR 0.006∗∗ 0.002 −0.00002 −0.0004 −0.0005
lagged.CF −0.502∗∗∗ 0.731∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ −0.038 0.071∗∗∗
lagged.OB1 −0.016 −0.778∗∗∗ −0.0005 −0.016∗∗ 0.005
lagged.OB12 −0.059 −1.061∗ −0.919∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 0.044
lagged.OB2 0.440 −0.692 −0.009 −0.323∗∗∗ −0.039
lagged.OtherOB 0.052 0.001 −0.002 0.007 −0.980∗∗∗
lagged.W.CF 0.492∗∗∗ −0.810∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗ 0.015 −0.077∗∗∗
lagged.W.OB1 0.203∗ 0.653∗∗∗ 0.008∗ −0.019 −0.013
lagged.W.OB12 −3.304 −2.602 0.058 0.386 0.663∗∗
lagged.W.OB2 0.760 −0.119 0.002 0.505∗∗ 0.050
lagged.W.OtherOB −0.579 −0.864 −0.021 0.047 0.044
3.group.CF 0.002 0.005∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗ −0.0001 0.0003∗
3.group.OB1 0.0002 0.006∗∗∗ 0.0001∗ −0.0003 0.0003
3.group.OB2 −0.0001 −0.0003 0.00000 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.00002
3.group.OtherOB 0.00004 0.0002 0.00001 −0.00001 0.0001∗∗∗
3.group.W.CF 0.0002 −0.00002 0.00000 0.0001 −0.0001
3.group.W.OB2 0.00004 −0.001∗∗ −0.00002∗ 0.00004 −0.00005
3.group.W.OtherOB −0.00003 −0.0004 −0.00001 −0.00002 −0.0001
N 350 350 350 350 350
Generalized R¯2 0.158 0.412 0.429 0.246 0.428
Weak IV F 4.44∗∗∗ 170.22∗∗∗ 1536.9∗∗∗ 11.30∗∗∗ 1161.8∗∗∗
Table 10: First Stage Regressions of Model II in Table 4. Significance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Generalized R¯2: generalization of R¯2 for ML estimates (see Nagelkerke, 1991). Weak IV F: test of
weakness of instruments.
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Dependent variable:
W.CF W.OB1 W.OB12 W.OB2 W.OtherOB
log.PROD.REL.IN −0.0003 −0.001∗ −0.00001 0.0001 −0.0001
log.INV.RATE −0.00003 0.001 0.00001 0.00000 −0.00000
log.EMP.GR 0.0004∗∗ 0.0003 0.00002 −0.00002 0.00000
W.log.PROD.REL.IN −0.002∗∗ −0.005∗∗ −0.0001 −0.0002 −0.00005
W.log.INV.RATE 0.004∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗ −0.0001 0.0001
W.log.EMP.GR −0.00002 −0.001 −0.0001 0.0003∗∗ −0.0002∗
lagged.CF 0.030 −0.245∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ 0.002 −0.007
lagged.OB1 −0.013∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ −0.001 0.004∗∗∗
lagged.OB12 0.099 −0.108 0.006 0.002 −0.011
lagged.OB2 0.138 0.247 −0.002 0.015 0.001
lagged.OtherOB −0.022∗ 0.045∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.0004 0.003∗∗
lagged.W.CF −0.040 0.385∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ −0.003 0.023∗∗∗
lagged.W.OB1 0.052∗∗ −0.538∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.011∗∗ 0.002
lagged.W.OB1 −1.193∗∗ 0.434 −0.763∗∗∗ 0.082 0.238∗∗∗
lagged.W.OB2 0.010 0.433 0.027 −0.161∗∗∗ 0.031
lagged.W.OtherOB −0.139 −1.120∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗ 0.035∗ −1.011∗∗∗
3.group.CF 0.00000 0.0001 −0.00003 0.0001 0.00000
3.group.OB1 −0.0002 0.001∗∗ 0.00001 0.00002 0.0001
3.group.OB2 0.00003 0.0001 0.00000 −0.00001 0.00000
3.group.OtherOB −0.0001∗ −0.0001 −0.00000∗ −0.00001 −0.00000
3.group.W.CF 0.0002∗ 0.0004 0.00000 −0.00002 0.00000
3.group.W.OB2 −0.00002 −0.0003∗∗∗ −0.00000 0.0001∗∗∗ −0.00001∗
3.group.OtherOB 0.0001∗∗ 0.0001 0.00000 −0.00002∗ 0.00001
N 350 350 350 350 350
Generalized R¯2 0.124 0.415 0.429 0.243 0.428
Weak IV F 1.65∗∗ 140.80∗∗∗ 906.56∗∗∗ 10.46∗∗∗ 1096.00∗∗∗
Table 11: First Stage Regressions of Model II in Table 4. Significance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Generalized R¯2: generalization of R¯2 for ML estimates (see Nagelkerke, 1991). Weak IV F: test of
weakness of instruments.
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I Annual Growth Rate of GDP Per Capita
Table 12 contains the results of the estimation of our model when the dependent variable
is the annual growth rate of GDP per capita with W =WDO and ϕ = 0.8).
Dependent variable Average annual growth rate of GDP per capita
Spatial Matrix WDO(ϕ = 0.8)
Model I II III
Funds SCF All Obj. All Obj.
REGIONAL FE YES YES YES
TIME DUMMIES YES YES YES
log.PROD.REL.IN −0.089
(0.000)
−0.089
(0.000)
−0.086
(0000)
log.INV.RATE −0.011
(0.000)
−0.009
(0.005)
−0.008
(0.006)
log.EMP.GR 0.030
(0.000)
0.029
(0.000)
0.029
(0.000)
HC 0.003
(0.752)
W.log.PROD.REL.IN 0.102
(0.000)
0.097
(0.000)
0.114
(0.000)
W.log.INV.RATE −0.033
(0.000)
−0.037
(0.015)
−0.039
(0.011)
W.log.EMP.GR −0.029
(0.000)
−0.031
(0.001)
−0.031
(0.001)
W.HC 0.009
(0.579)
SCF 0.238
(0.019)
SCF2 −1.737
(0.070)
W.SCF 2.464
(0.000)
W.SCF2 −32.986
(0.000)
OB1 0.118
(0.365)
0.129
(0.322)
OB12 −0.285
(0.834)
−0.468
(0.731)
OB2 −0.407
(0.773)
−0.401
(0.776)
OtherOB −0.127
(0.436)
−0.023
(0.883)
CF −0.190
(0.761)
−0.121
(0.846)
W.OB1 1.617
(0.007)
1.860
(0.003)
W.OB12 −33.260
(0.000)
−37.2843
(0.000)
W.OB2 3.648
(0.543)
3.092
(0.615)
W.OtherOB 4.333
(0.000)
3.092
(0.003)
W.CF 3.453
(0.320)
4.103
(0.244)
N 350 350 350
AICc -2244.197 -2174.52 -2131.17
Generalized R¯2 0.91 0.90 0.90
LR test of endogeneity 45.241
(0.000)
12.767
(0.0125)
15.141
(0.127)
Test of over-identifying restrictions 0.944
(0.419)
0.226
(0.878)
0.559
(0.789)
Table 12: Estimation of Model (16) for GDP per capita under different specification of spatial weights
matrix and disaggregation of funds. P-values in parenthesis. Funds with two-year lags. Spatial weights
matrices are defined in Appendix E. Instrumental variables used in the control of endogeneity of funds
(lagged funds and instruments derived by the three-group method described in Kennedy, 2008), the test
of endogeneity, and the test of over-identifying restrictions for the validity of instrumental variables are
discussed in Appendix F. AICc: Akaike criterion for small samples (see Anderson, 2007). Generalized
R¯2: generalization of R¯2 for ML estimates (see Nagelkerke, 1991).
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